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RESPONSE: ANIMUS, ITS CRITICS, AND ITS
POTENTIAL
William D. Araiza*
Philosophers may still disagree whether a tree falling in the
woods out of human earshot makes a sound, but any academic can
tell you that a piece of scholarship that lies unread and
unremarked on makes no impact beyond that on the author
herself. For this reason, I'm deeply grateful for the careful
engagement provided to my book, Animus: A Brief Introduction to
Bias in the Law,' by the participants in the Stetson Law Review's
symposium devoted to that book.2 I'm particularly grateful to
Professors Daniel Conkle and Katie Eyer for their insightful and
generous written comments on the concept of animus,3 and to
Michelle Moretz for her careful consideration of the question of
sexual orientation as a protected ground under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 These written pieces, and Professors
Conkle's and Eyer's previous writing on animus doctrine,' have
* @ Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This response addresses articles that were
written as part of a larger symposium on my book, Animus: A Brief Introduction to Bias in
the Law (2017), held at Stetson University College of Law on April 20, 2018. My deep thanks
go out to all of the participants in that symposium, to the staff of the Stetson Law Review,
and to the faculty and staff at Stetson University College of Law, especially Professor Lou
Virelli, who suggested the symposium originally.
1. WILLIAM ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017)
[hereinafter ARAIZA, ANIMUS].
2. Animus: A Brief Introduction to Bias in the Law, Stetson Law Symposium (Apr. 20,
2018) (video on file with the Stetson Law Review).
3. Daniel Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle and Judicial
Prudence, 48 STETSON L. REV. 195 (2019) [hereinafter Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives];
Katie Eyer, Animus Trouble, 48 STETSON L. REV. 215 (2019) [hereinafter Eyer, Animus
Trouble].
4. Michelle Moretz, Comment, Baldwin, Hively, and Christiansen, Oh My! Navigating
the Yellow Brick Road of Employment Discrimination for LGBT Plaintiffs, 48 STETSON L.
REV. 235 (2019).
5. See, e.g., Daniel Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND.
L.J. 27 (2014) [hereinafter Conkle, Evolving Values] (suggesting that substantive due
process and heightened equal protection scrutiny offer better doctrinal paths than animus
to the constitutional recognition of same-sex marriage); Brief of Amici Curiae Steven G.
Calabresi, Daniel 0. Conkle, Michael J. Perry, & Brett G. Scharffs In Support of Certiorari
and Opposing a Ruling Based on Voters' Motivations, Herbert v. Kitchen, 2014 WL 4380924
Stetson Law Review
engaged and challenged my own thinking about animus and
equality law more generally, and in the process have improved it
greatly. This brief response engages both their earlier works and
their contributions to the Stetson Law Review's symposium, as well
as Ms. Moretz's fine illustration of the difficulties faced by, but also
the opportunities available to, emerging groups seeking equality
today.' Part I responds to Professor Conkle, Part II responds to
Professor Eyer, and Part III responds to Ms. Moretz. Part IV
synthesizes these responses into some overall reflections. Those
final reflections are not-at least I hope that they are not-the end
of the dialogue. The issues animus doctrine raises are too
important to call any one statement the final word.
I PRINCIPLE, PRUDENCE, AND STATESMANSHIP
A. The Critique
Professor Conkle's contribution to the Stetson Law Review,
like his other scholarship that addresses animus, is
characteristically generous, smart, and informed by a deep concern
for the American constitutional project. His Stetson Law Review
contribution recognizes "that animus doctrine is sound as a matter
of constitutional principle."7 Generously, he describes my
argument as "compelling,"' and agrees with me that "animus-
based lawmaking violates deep-seated constitutional
understandings and should be regarded as categorically
impermissible."9
Nevertheless, Professor Conkle expresses two concerns about
animus doctrine, both of which he places under the broad umbrella
of concerns about what he calls "judicial prudence."10 First, he
worries about the workability of animus doctrine. Professor Conkle
(U.S. Sept. 4, 2014) (No. 14-124) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae] (urging the Court to
grant review in a same-sex marriage case, but, without arguing for a particular result,
simply arguing that the Court should reject an animus justification for striking down state
same-sex marriage bans); Katie Eyer, The Canon ofRational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1317 (2018) [hereinafter Eyer, The Canon] (comparing animus doctrine unfavorably
with standard rational basis review); Katie Eyer, Protected Class Rational Basis Review, 95
N.C. L. REV. 975 (2017) [hereinafter Eyer, Protected Class] (same).
6. Moretz, supra note 4.
7. Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives, supra note 3, at 198.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 199.
10. Id. at 197.
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identifies concerns about both how we should define animus and
how courts should go about uncovering it." With regard to the first,
Professor Conkle wonders how beliefs based on religious and other
morality-based worldviews fit within a doctrinal structure that
condemns "a bare . . . desire to harm"12 a particular group.13
Hearkening to Justice Kennedy's acknowledgement in Obergefell
v. Hodges that much religious-based opposition to same-sex
marriage is based on "decent and honorable" precepts,1 4 he
acknowledges that opponents of same-sex marriage cannot
instantiate such morality-based opposition in law. 5 Nevertheless,
he considers it "tendentious"" to describe such opposition as based
in animus. This objection thus sounds in concerns about
definitions-namely, how one can fairly characterize particular
attitudes and arguments as based in animus. Still focusing on
workability, Professor Conkle then wonders, more prosaically but
still importantly, how a court can determine whether animus,
however defined, is responsible for a given decision if that decision
was also actuated by other, more public-regarding motives.1 7
Moving then to judicial statesmanship, Professor Conkle
reprises concerns he has expressed before, about the deleterious
effects of animus allegations on American political, legal, and
11. Id. at 198, 202-04.
12. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973). The "bare desire to
harm" language has become the canonical judicial formulation of what constitutes "animus."
See also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (quoting that same language);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(same); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (same); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985) (same).
13. See Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives, supra note 3, at 101 ("[Q]uestions of
workability [concerning animus doctrine] remain, notably including the core definitional
question: exactly what counts as forbidden animus? . . . For example, what if the belief in
question is a religious belief about human nature or personal morality?"); id. ("[Rieligious
beliefs about human nature or personal morality are not easily equated with animus, at
least not invariably, in that they do not necessarily entail hatred, dislike, or disfavor for a
group of people as such.").
14. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
15. Id.
16. Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives, supra note 3, at 202.
17. See id. ("Even if animus can be defined appropriately and with sufficient clarity,
there remains the problem of mixed motives or mixed purposes, when a law is based in part
on animus but in part on other, public-regarding objectives.") (footnote omitted).
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social dialogue.1 8 Using eloquent language,19 he worries about the
fate of American democracy when such debate takes the form of
name-calling that polarizes and tribalizes our politics. For this
reason, he concludes that "judicial prudence generally, and judicial
statesmanship in particular, counsel against the use of animus
doctrine."2 0 To be sure, Professor Conkle agrees with me that, as a
matter of constitutional theory, animus is both a valid and
important concept. 21 Nevertheless, he concludes, concerns about its
judicial workability and impact on American political debate
justify its use only as "a doctrine of last resort, to be utilized only
when there is no viable and preferable doctrinal alternative."2 2
In the final part of his paper, Professor Conkle offers such an
alternative: suspect class analysis. He argues that of the classic
animus "quadrilogy"-Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and Windsor-
three cases (all but Moreno) could and should have been decided by
according the group in question suspect or quasi-suspect class
status and applying the requisite level of heightened scrutiny to
strike down the action in question.23 To be sure, Professor Conkle
acknowledges arguments that suspect class analysis is difficult to
manage. 24 But he notes that animus doctrine presents similar
workability challenges.2 5 With this consideration in what he calls
equipoise, for Professor Conkle the deciding factor becomes
"judicial statesmanship." 2 7 He argues that suspect class doctrine is
superior to animus doctrine on this ground because it produces
fewer deleterious effects on democratic debate. To repeat,
Professor Conkle doesn't flatly reject animus. Indeed, he at least
implies that no better theory justifies the Court's result in Moreno,
18. Id. at 205; Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 9 ("Charging voters [who supported
initiatives supporting same-sex marriage bans] with bias will unnecessarily vilify those who
disagree and will chill public debate.").
19. See, e.g., Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives, supra note 3, at 205 ("America today
is being torn apart by sharply worded political rhetoric and extreme political polarization,
trends that are threatening the very fabric of our democracy."); id. at 206 ("Invoking animus
in resolving such disputes . . . fans the flames of our cultural conflagrations.").
20. Id. at 206.
21. Id. at 198-99.
22. Id. at 198.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 208 ("Turning to considerations of judicial prudence, one might argue that
[suspect class] doctrine is, or has become, unworkable.... The identification of suspect and
quasi-suspect classifications is not an exact science.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 210.
27. Id.
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the first of the animus "quadrilogy." 28 Nevertheless, for Professor
Conkle, judicial use of animus doctrine should be, as he says, a
"last resort," employed only when other doctrinal tools are
unavailable.
B. Response
I begin with the common ground between Professor Conkle
and myself. I appreciate his acknowledgement of the foundational
nature of the anti-animus idea in American constitutional law.
This agreement renders our disagreement simultaneously more
technical and at the same time more normative. On the technical
side, Professor Conkle's critique centers on the difficulty courts
face when attempting to decide whether, in fact, a challenged
government action is infected with animus. More normatively, his
discussion of "judicial statesmanship" requires consideration of the
collateral effects of animus doctrine-in particular, its effect in
encouraging uncivil, winner-takes-all discourse in a democratic
society.29 Both of these concerns are fair. Ultimately, however, they
should not push courts away from a forthright reliance on animus
doctrine when appropriate.
First, as to practicalities: detecting animus and pronouncing
its presence does indeed present courts with a difficult challenge.
The animus inquiry, by requiring investigation into governmental
motive, raises all the difficulties courts have encountered in other
areas of the law where motive matters. Prominent among those
difficulties is one that Professor Conkle raises: the problem of
mixed motives. Nevertheless, because this inquiry and its related
problems are common to other areas of the law, the solutions the
law has created in those other areas, such as presumptions and
28. As Conkle writes:
Given the [Moreno] statute's impact on personal decisions concerning intimate,
family-like relationships, perhaps the Court in Moreno could have grounded its
ruling on substantive due process. But the doctrine of substantive due process
raises difficult questions of its own, both as a matter of constitutional principle
and as a matter of judicial prudence. In any event, if neither substantive due
process nor any other alternative ground was viable and preferable in Moreno,
then the Court's animus ruling was proper.
Id. at 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
29. See, e.g., Conkle, Evolving Values, supra note 5, at 41-42 (worrying that an animus
justification for striking down state same-sex marriage bans would make it more difficult
to accommodate religiously-based opposition to same-sex marriage).
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burden-shifting frameworks,3 0 should be able to do analogous work
in the animus area. Indeed, much of my book attempts to
demonstrate how the Supreme Court's animus decisions have,
without explicitly acknowledging it, borrowed from the analogous
framework in discriminatory intent jurisprudence.3 1
To be sure, this response does not fully answer Professor
Conkle's concern about workability. Most importantly, it does not
answer his question about the animus status of religious- or
morality-based opposition to the traits that mark certain persons,
such as sexual orientation or gender identity. I address this more
normative concern below.
As to judicial statesmanship: Professor Conkle is surely
justified in raising a concern about the impact animus allegations
have on the already-fraught nature of American political
discourse. But ironically, it is exactly that fraught nature that
militates in favor of courts employing animus doctrine when
appropriate. In my symposium keynote, I argued that the very
existence of a political and social environment marked by
xenophobia and deep cultural conflict on fundamental issues of
identity and national belonging requires a jurisprudence that is
willing to call out animus when it exists. 32
To be sure, the very rhetorical power of an animus conclusion
counsels caution about its use. Courts should not wield animus
doctrine as an all-purpose tool to combat any form of
discrimination they may find distasteful, irrational, or even deeply
unfair.33 For example, a sincere misunderstanding of the
capabilities of persons with a particular disability may warrant
judicial correction, whether via rational basis or some higher form
of equal protection review, some form of fundamental rights
review, or a combination of the two.34 So might an unthinking
30. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (creating what
is now known as the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting framework in which the plaintiff
must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, shifting the burden to
the employer to show a non-discriminatory reason for termination or rejection, then shifting
the burden back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's response was merely a pretext
for discriminatorily motivated behavior).
31. ARAIZA, ANIMUS, supra note 1, at 79-143.
32. William D. Araiza, Call It By Its Name, 48 STETSON L. REV. 181 (2019) [hereinafter
Araiza, Call It By Its Name].
33. See id. at 193 ("creating an animus doctrine that is both fit for and limited to its
appropriate tasks helps ensure the vitality of the doctrine") (emphasis in original).
34. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455, 460 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part) ("I have long
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stereotype about appropriate sex roles.3 5 But at the same time, it
would be appropriate to refrain from condemning such actions as
grounded in animus.36
Such forbearance may be similarly appropriate when
discrimination can be fairly understood in moral terms. Of course,
that proposition presumes an ability to distinguish between good
faith religious or moral beliefs and animus that deserves to be
identified as such and promptly rejected. Professor Conkle worries
about the former being mistaken for the latter. 37 But I believe that
the structure I sketched out in Animus, when sensitively applied,
provides courts with tools with which to distinguish the two.
First, opposition to a particular equality claim can be
examined for its connection to what we normally understand as
issues relevant to what constitutes a moral life. For example, one
might be hard-pressed to label as animus-based a religion's refusal
to perform a same-sex marriage. To be sure, such a refusal might
well reflect a view of same-sex unions as distinctly inferior to other
unions that the given religion validates with the term "marriage."
But the choices one makes about one's intimate life and other
analogously self- constitutive choices are sufficiently and
conventionally understood and described as morality-based, such
that condemnation of these choices is typically understood as a
moral judgment, rather than simple dislike of persons who make
those disfavored choices.3 8 To be sure, instantiation of such moral
believed the level of scrutiny employed in an equal protection case should vary with the
constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
35. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (identifying "archaic
and overbroad" sex stereotypes as subject to judicial correction).
36. To be sure, as Professor Conkle recognizes, standard suspect class analysis focuses
in part on whether the discrimination at issue has a long historical pedigree, and in part on
whether that discrimination turns on a trait that is "broadly irrelevant to legitimate
generalization, rendering discrimination on this basis not only unfair but also indefensible
in a wide range of governmental settings." See Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives, supra
note 3, at 208 (quoting Daniel Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage,
89 IND. L.J. 27, 34-35 (2014)). This (accurate) description of suspect class analysis reveals
more than a hint of animus-based reasoning.
37. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.").
38. Indeed, Professor Conkle's illustration of the type of morality-based viewpoints he
is talking about focuses exactly on such subjects. See Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives,
supra note 3, at 201 (describing the viewpoints he is discussing as "typically reflect[ing]
religious perspectives about how people should live their lives and structure their
interpersonal relationships").
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judgments into public law remains unconstitutional.39
Nevertheless, such unconstitutional lawmaking need not, and
should not, be held up as an instance of animus, unless
independent reasons exist to suspect the sort of intentional social
subordination that I argue should be understood as reflecting
animus.40
At the other extreme from private religious beliefs, across-the-
board opposition to the equal civil status of a group should best be
understood as opposition to that group's standing as equal
members of the community.4 1 Even if such opposition is grounded
in religious teachings, the willingness of such opponents to
subordinate a group in the context of civil society can only be
understood as "a bare . . . desire to harm"4 2 or the disapproval of
that group, if that term is to have any meaning. Such
discrimination would appropriately be subject to condemnation as
animus-based. Simply put, one cannot be heard to assert a "sincere
moral judgment," based on "decent and honorable precepts,"4 3
when alleging that a lesbian has no right to any legal protection at
39. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ('Our prior cases make two
propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding
a law prohibiting the practice."') (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (finding
Establishment Clause violations in laws that are not supported by a "secular legislative
purpose").
40. This caveat justifies the Court's animus conclusion in Windsor, while
simultaneously embracing a presumption that state law same-sex marriage bans of the sort
struck down in Obergefell should not be viewed as grounded in animus. By contrast to those
bans, the federal Defense of Marriage Act's (DOMA's) unusual intrusion into the realm of
states' power to define marriage, the wholesale nature of the federal definition of marriage
as between one man and one woman (as opposed, say, to a more granular definition for
purposes of particular federal programs), and its effect of subordinating state-validated
same-sex marriages all gave reason for the animus label the Court affixed to DOMA. For
another statement of the argument about intentional social subordination as the core of the
animus idea, see William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, FLA. L. REV. (manuscript
at 66-74) (forthcoming 2019) (Brooklyn Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 563)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3225974 [hereinafter Araiza, Animus
and Its Discontents].
41. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (using the language of caste to describe the effect
of Amendment 2).
42. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
43. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) ("Many who deem same-sex
marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.").
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all.44 To be sure, these two extreme examples present the easy
cases. But they illustrate the basic idea.
The book's proposed structure accounts for this idea. Most
notably, its direction to courts to consider the scope of the
challenged discrimination, such as whether that discrimination
imposes an across-the-board disability, helps distinguish between
areas that are properly the subject of good faith moral
disagreement and those that are susceptible to an animus
analysis.45 So does the book's insistence on considering the more
specific context of the discrimination.4 6 In particular, more private
realms, whether religious or intimately interpersonal, may be
thought the proper realm of morality-based arguments, as
Professor Conkle himself suggests.4 7 By contrast, the pluralistic
and heterogeneous nature of the social, governmental, and
commercial worlds render morality arguments for discrimination
in those areas not only less constitutionally cognizable4 8 but also,
depending on the facts of the given case,49 more amenable to a
characterization of such discrimination as reflecting a desire to
subordinate that group within those secular realms.
Thus, in situations where it applies-not just situations where
no other doctrinal tool is available, but rather, situations that
squarely present discrimination that can fairly be described as
animus-based'o-courts should, as my keynote argues, call such
discrimination by its name." To do otherwise obscures the reality
of the situation under the bloodless technocratic jargon of tiers of
scrutiny and comparisons of statutory ends and means.
44. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (describing Amendment 2 as making "a class of persons
a stranger to its laws").
45. See, e.g., ARAIZA, ANIMUS, supra note 1, at 56-58 (explaining Romer in this way).
46. See, e.g., id. at 145-51 (discussing the context of disability discrimination).
47. Supra note 38.
48. See supra note 39 (citing Due Process Clause and Establishment Clause cases
rejecting morality as a legitimate government interest for a challenged law). This same
pluralism provides government with a significant interest in ensuring equal status in those
realms even when the Constitution does not directly guarantee it. See, e.g., Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727, 1732 (2018) (recognizing the
government interest in ensuring full and equal access to the marketplace).
49. See, e.g., ARAIZA, ANIMUS, supra note 1, at 144-62 (providing examples of types of
discrimination that, based on their facts, might or might not appropriately be condemned
as animus-based).
50. See id. (discussing cases that justify a court condemning the challenged law as
animus-based).
51. See generally Araiza, Call It By Its Name, supra note 32 (calling on courts to label
actions as animus-based when that description is appropriate).
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Heightened scrutiny may get litigants to the same place-again,
Professor Conkle seems to agree that when it doesn't, recourse to
animus doctrine may be appropriate.5 2 But it does so without
courts playing any public role in calling out animus when it exists.
Professor Conkle believes that such judicial reticence is
appropriate to avoid courts embroiling themselves in deep cultural
conflicts. The concerns he identifies make it clear that a choice has
to be made. Professor Conkle's (completely legitimate) choice is for
such reticence. Mine is for judicial candor.
. ANIMUS TROUBLE
A. The Critique
Professor Eyer's contribution, just like Professor Conkle's,
raises serious questions about animus doctrine-questions that,
again like those posed by Professor Conkle, she has raised in
previous writing.5 3 Professor Eyer's concerns about animus connect
objections to its accuracy as a description of the Court's modern
equal protection jurisprudence with normative worries about its
implications for the future course of equal protection law and its
potential as a tool for positive change.54 These concerns merit a
serious response.
Professor Eyer's critique of animus is largely grounded in her
favorable view of rational basis, or what she calls "minimum tier,"
review. As a descriptive matter, Professor Eyer contends that such
review has yielded a degree of success for emerging social
movements, which may be surprising to those who associate such
scrutiny with inevitable wins for the government." To be sure, she
recognizes that such victories both resulted from and created
further ambiguities in rational basis review, which she describes
as "messy" and underdetermined." However, Professor Eyer
52. See, e.g., Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives, supra note 3, at 212 (concluding that
Moreno was appropriately decided as an animus case).
53. Eyer, The Canon, supra note 5 (comparing animus doctrine unfavorably with
standard rational basis review); Eyer, Protected Class, supra note 5 (same).
54. Supra note 53.
55. Eyer,Animus Trouble, supra note 3, at 216.
56. See id. at 221-24 (discussing the extent to which rational basis scrutiny has yielded
victories for social movement litigators).
57. See, e.g., id. at 217 (noting that "rational basis victories have continued to be a messy
affair"); id. at 224 (stating that "opinions affirming rational basis victories have tended to
be muddy and ill-defined").
284 [Vol. 48
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considers that messiness is a benefit, rather than a drawback, of
rational basis review, since, as she explains, that feature opens up
doctrinal space that social movement litigators can exploit.5 8 The
most relevant point about such victories, she argues, is that they
were won before any animus argument was even remotely
plausible. 59 Thus, she concludes, it is simply incorrect to argue that
animus is an indispensable element of a successful rational basis
challenge.o
This description of "minimum tier" review provides the basis
for Professor Eyer's normative concern about animus. Animus
doctrine, she argues, forecloses future opportunities for emerging
group victories of the sort she describes." She fears that if animus
doctrine comes to predominate thinking about non-suspect class
judicial review-that is, if animus becomes understood as the main
or even exclusive path for such classes to obtain meaningful
rational basis review-then the generative potential of minimum
tier review will be lost.6 2 As evidence of this dynamic, she concludes
her comments by noting how the majority in Trump v. Hawaii6 3
seemed to describe animus as playing just a gatekeeper role.64
Thus, just as the intent requirement restrains the generative
potential of equal protection review generally, 5 so too, she fears,
the creation of an animus requirement as a gatekeeper for
meaningful rational basis review will restrain the future potential
for the types of victories she describes emerging social groups as
having won over the last several decades."
B. Response
As with Professor Conkle's paper, there is much to admire, and
for me to be grateful for, in Professor Eyer's forceful yet careful
analysis. Her emphasis on what she has called the Supreme
58. Id. at 217.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 224-25.
61. Id. at 216-17, 226.
62. Id. at 226-28.
63. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
64. Eyer, Animus Trouble, supra note 3, at 230-33.
65. Id. at 228.
66. Id. at 219-21 (noting how even racial justice groups won rational basis victories
before equal protection doctrine hardened into the bifurcated structure that existed until
the creation of the intermediate tier in the mid-1970s).
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Court's "rational basis canon"" and her meticulous excavation of
lower court cases in which social movement litigators prevailed by
using rational basis review remind us of the submerged legal
history-often messy but for that reason generative-that often is
overly tidied-up by scholars after the fact. Nevertheless, such
tidying up, or systemization, may generate benefits beyond
doctrinal housekeeping for its own sake. Indeed, in the case of
animus doctrine, that tidying up can help achieve the types of
results Professor Eyer hopes to make possible through her
scholarship.
My hope in writing Animus was to provide clarity about a
concept that the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized. To be
sure, the Court has not provided the relatively detailed doctrinal
structure that Animus offers. Nevertheless, in providing that
structure, the book, and my other work on that concept,18 aspires
to provide a roadmap for a concept that already exists, and that
Justices have recognized as a distinctive idea at least as far back
as Justice O'Connor's 2003 concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas69 and
as recently as the Court's majority opinion in Hawaii v. Trump.70
My hope in providing that structure is to provide a roadmap
for courts-especially lower courts-seeking to determine whether
unconstitutional animus exists in a given case. Professor Eyer's
concern appears to be, in part, that such a roadmap-and, indeed,
even recognition of animus as a distinct legal concept-would
crowd out the garden-variety, non-animus-inflected, rational basis
review that she views (correctly) as having been so important to
emerging social groups at the outset of their litigation sagas. But
animus exists as an equal protection concept. In light of this
reality, an important task for scholars is to explain what that
concept means or should mean. My own contribution to that
attempt focuses not only on the narrow question of what animus is
and how courts should identify it, but also on where animus fits
within the broader constellation of constitutional equality
67. See generally Eyer, The Canon, supra note 5 (presenting what she describes as
several canonical rational basis review cases).
68. See, e.g., Araiza,Animus and Its Discontents, supra note 40 (presenting an approach
to animus that fits the Supreme Court's analyses of the issue and harmonizes it with its
approach to the closely-related doctrine of discriminatory intent).
69. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
70. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018).
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doctrines.7" To be sure, my efforts on the latter question have been
halting and speculative. But my argument that animus doctrine
can find its roots in the venerable concept of class legislation (an
argument that Professor Eyer, to her credit, acknowledges) 72 offers
a hope of reconnecting modern equal protection doctrine to its
historical roots. In the context of a doctrine that has now attained
at least some measure of judicial recognition, this seems to me a
worthwhile enterprise.
But what about the crowding out that concerns Professor
Eyer? It is my hope that animus does not crowd out such claims.
Instead, in my book, I have attempted to explain how animus
doctrine can complement traditional equal protection doctrine. I
argue that animus analysis complements traditional heightened
scrutiny review, replicating the steps of that more traditional
doctrinal structure when those more traditional steps are, for
whatever reason, unavailable. 73 To be sure, rational basis review
is not heightened scrutiny; thus, it's fair for scholars such as
Professor Eyer to worry that a widely applied animus doctrine
would become, in her words, a "gatekeeper"74 doctrine that would
serve to defeat rational basis arguments unless the court could
reasonably suspect animus. This is not my goal, nor is it, in my
view, a necessary effect. By situating animus doctrine within the
broader scope of class legislation history, I hope to make clear that
animus doctrine is one strand of, or one path toward, a better
understanding of what equal protection is all about.75
An example may help clarify this. In my book, I discuss a
variety of types of discrimination that, at least in some cases, could
71. See, e.g., ARAIZA, ANIMUS, supra note 1, at 11c28, 176-78 (locating modern animus
doctrine within the nineteenth-century class legislation tradition); Araiza, Animus and Its
Discontents, supra note 40, at 62-84 (same).
72. Eyer, Animus Trouble, supra note 3, at 226 n.62.
73. ARAIZA, ANIMUS, supra note 1, at 105-33 (explaining how the proper steps in the
animus inquiry parallel those in more traditional equal protection review). See also Conkle,
Animus and Its Alternatives, supra note 3 (expressing a preference for heightened scrutiny
under traditional suspect class analysis rather than animus, but recognizing a role for
animus doctrine when such heightened scrutiny is unavailable).
74. Eyer, Animus Trouble, supra note 3, at 226-28.
75. See, e.g., Araiza, Call It By Its Name, supra note 32, at 188, 192-93 (suggesting that
animus can be understood as one modern strand among several of the type of class
legislation condemned by nineteenth-century jurisprudence and calling for a project of
delineating the proper reach of animus doctrine, in order to ensure that it does not become
an all-purpose claim available to any equal protection plaintiff).
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conceivably be thought of as being motivated by animus."6
Disability is one such example." I argue that, in order for such
discrimination not to be considered animus-based, it has to be
"careful, calm, and compassionate," not "overbroad," "hysterical,"
or "based on mean-spiritedness or disgust." 8 But even if such
discrimination can be described using the former, more benign set
of terms, this doesn't mean that such discrimination is necessarily
constitutional. Government can make mistakes, even when it acts
in good faith. Deep, but sincere, misunderstandings of a disability
may lead even the best-intended decision-maker to make decisions
that we could reasonably condemn as irrational. We would not-or
at least should not-describe such mistakes or misunderstandings
or even unintentional stereotyping as animus.
Concededly, doctrinal slippage can confound this analysis. As
Professor Eyer suggests, the everyday understanding of the term
animus connotes a significantly bad state of mind.7 9 If left
uncorrected, that common understanding, when combined with
the temptation to equate "unconstitutional" with "evil,"8 0 raises the
risk that courts will insist on some type of subjective bad intent in
an equal protection challenge that does not already carry the
doctrinal and moral force of explicitly heightened scrutiny. Thus,
animus-in a strong, subjective form-risks becoming the
gatekeeper Professor Eyer worries about, prompting her anxiety
about systematizing and thus more firmly establishing something
called "animus doctrine."
But animus doctrine is already here. Given that it is here, it
is essential that it be explained, in part so it can be celebrated, but
also so it can be properly cabined.8 1 To be clear, and in particular
to make clear where Professor Eyer and I part ways, I do celebrate
animus doctrine. I believe that it responds to something real, and
does so with candor and force rather than obfuscation and
indirection. But just as my book should not lead a court to uphold
76. See generally ARAIZA, ANIMUS, supra note 1, at 144-62 (providing several such
examples).
77. See generally id. at 145-51 (discussing disability discrimination and its relation to
animus).
78. Id. at 147.
79. Eyer, Animus Trouble, supra note 3, at 229.
80. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, supra note 40, at 78-80 (suggesting the
attractiveness of this temptation).
81. See generally ARAIZA, ANIMUS, supra note 1, at 144-62 (considering examples where
an animus conclusion is appropriate and examples where it is not).
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a seriously mistaken but animus-free instance of disability
discrimination, so too should its more general explanation of
animus not be taken as advocacy of animus as an indispensable
element of any equal protection claim, including one made under
the rational basis standard.
To be sure, my book focuses on when animus should be found,
not when it should not be found. But this should hardly be
surprising, given that courts have done a very poor job of
explaining the animus concept. To delineate a concept's proper
realm usually requires beginning by demarcating that realm,
rather than identifying situations where it does not apply.
Regardless, and to be completely clear, animus should not be
understood as supplanting other forms of equal protection
scrutiny. As the book sets forth in detail, that concept should be
understood as supplementing heightened scrutiny, performing the
same role of smoking out bad intent that strict scrutiny is
explained as doing.8 2 It should also serve to supplement
conventional rational basis review.
That last statement requires unpacking the relationship
between animus doctrine and both heightened scrutiny and
rational basis review. By contrast to its close connection with
heightened scrutiny, 83 animus doctrine has a more tenuous
relationship with rational basis review. This is counter-intuitive,
since animus cases are, in fact, cases where-for whatever
reason-heightened scrutiny is inappropriate or otherwise
unavailable. In other words, animus cases are rational basis cases
where a court finds animus lurking.84 This distinction thus implies
82. Id. at 112-14.
83. Id.
84. To be sure, at times courts will speak of "discriminatory animus" when considering
claims that government actors are unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of a
characteristic that triggers more than rational basis review. In other words, courts will
sometimes look for "animus" even when being asked to perform heightened scrutiny. See,
e.g., N.Y. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 315 F. Supp. 3d 766, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("To state a
claim under the [equal protection component of the] Fifth Amendment in the circumstances
presented here [which feature claims of race and ethnicity discrimination], NGO Plaintiffs
have to plausibly allege that Defendants' decision was motivated by discriminatory animus
and its application results in a discriminatory effect.") (internal quotation omitted). In
particular, they sometimes seem to equate the discriminatory intent such claims require
with "discriminatory animus." See, e.g., id. (implying that the discriminatory intent
requirement equal protection plaintiffs face can be satisfied by a showing of "discriminatory
animus"). This phenomenon raises fascinating questions about whether animus doctrine
can generate positive doctrinal changes in the traditional discriminatory intent
jurisprudence that has existed now for a generation. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
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a category of "pure" irrationality cases-that is, cases where no bad
intent (subjective or objective) is hinted at. Such cases exist-at
least if courts are willing to perform more careful review than the
toothless, extremely deferential, formulation of such review as
exemplified in canonical cases such as Railway Express v. New
York." But those cases implicate raw inaccuracy-indeed,
inaccuracy to the point of something that can be plausibly
described as "irrationality." Such irrationality may arise from
concepts such as stereotyping, but unless those cases are
understood as simply featuring a "lite" version of animus, they are
shorn of any plausible claim that they are based in any sort of bad
intent.
Such cases exist; indeed, in past writing I have highlighted the
difference between such cases and animus cases, in the particular
(and unique) context of the "class-of-one" doctrine.8 ' But they are
qualitatively different from animus cases. As such, it would
constitute a category mistake to insist that any rational basis
claim features allegations of animus. Of course, there is always the
possibility that courts will commit that exact mistake-that is,
that courts will come to conjoin such "pure" rational basis claims
and animus claims, such that the former cannot succeed without
proof of the latter. But that is all the more reason to explain
animus doctrine: to ensure that it occupies a recognized channel of
equal protection law, one that holds the potential to connect
modern equal protection doctrine with its historical roots, but also
to ensure that that doctrine stays within its recognized, but
properly demarcated, channel.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (setting forth criteria by which courts can uncover
discriminatory intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (announcing the intent
requirement). These possibilities lay far beyond the scope of this brief response Essay.
85. 336 U.S. 106 (1949). E.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm'n of Webster
Cty., 488 U.S. 336 (1989); see also William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of
One Equal Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493 (2007) [hereinafter Araiza, Irrationality
and Animus] (discussing the concept in the context of class-of-one equal protection cases).
86. Cf Eyer,Animus Trouble, supra note 3, at 217 (noting rational basis review requires
no showing of animus in order for a challenged law to be struck down).
87. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus, supra note 85. In that Article, I tentatively
suggest that "pure irrationality" class-of-one cases may be best understood as substantive
due process cases. Id. at 514-15. This conclusion is based on the unique aspects of class-of-
one cases; by contrast, there is no reason such "pure irrationality" claims of class-based
discrimination are conceptually incompatible with review under the Equal Protection
Clause.
88. See supra note 76 (discussing examples of laws triggering animus-based equal
protection claims).
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Indeed, to close this part of my response, I would urge, contra
Professor Eyer, that Hawaii v. Trump stands as a lesson favoring
the animus project as a matter of scholarly attention. Professor
Eyer cites the Court's language suggesting that successful rational
basis claims must normally include allegations of animus to urge
abandoning animus as a doctrinal theory, on the ground that it will
become irretrievably conjoined with garden-variety rational basis
claims.8 9 But another way to respond to that language is as a
clarion call to scholars to explain the animus concept, to ensure
that courts understand its proper-and its properly limited-role.
Doing so can make it clear that animus should not invade the
domain of "pure irrationality" cases. One can, and should, argue
for that limitation, even while urging that animus doctrine can
serve salutary roles, both in connecting modern equal protection
doctrine with its historical aspirations and in providing a vehicle
for courts to respond forthrightly to government actions that clash
with those aspirations.
HI. LGB RIGHTS AND TITLE VII
A. The Argument
At first blush, Michelle Moretz's Comment examining the
pathways for Title VII plaintiffs wishing to allege sexual
orientation discrimination9 0 does not directly engage animus
doctrine. To be sure, gay rights claims more generally have been
the vehicle for the Supreme Court's most recent applications of the
animus concept.9 1 Nevertheless, Ms. Moretz's carefully constructed
argument proposes several theories by which LGB9 2 plaintiffs
might be able to succeed in moving forward with claims of sexual
orientation-based employment discrimination, none of which
89. Eyer, Animus Trouble, supra note 3, at 232.
90. Moretz, supra note 4.
91. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (holding the Defense of
Marriage Act unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment) (concurring in the majority decision holding a Texas statute
that bans same-sex sodomy unconstitutional); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996)
(holding unconstitutional a Colorado amendment denying protection from discrimination
based on sexual orientation).
92. Moretz, supra note 4, at 238. It is unclear whether transgender Title VII plaintiffs
face the same doctrinal structure as LGB plaintiffs, given that transgender plaintiffs would
not be alleging, or seeking to allege, sexual orientation discrimination.
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explicitly incorporates animus-based reasoning.9 3 As she notes,
some such plaintiffs have succeeded in pleading that they were
discriminated against because their conduct did not conform to
gender norms.9 4 Analogizing to Title VII race cases, she also argues
that LGB plaintiffs should be able to bring Title VII claims alleging
discrimination based on the employee's choice of spouse or
intimate partner.9 5 Finally, she argues that courts should embrace
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's)
conclusion that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes sex
discrimination, and thus is directly prohibited by Title VII.96
B. Response
Ms. Moretz's careful untangling and presentation of these
distinct doctrinal paths for LGB Title VII plaintiffs reflects, albeit
distantly, the structure for equal protection law that I advocate for
in my book. Just as her piece lays out different paths for LGB Title
VII plaintiffs, my book argues that different paths exist for
constitutional equality plaintiffs. Equality arguments can rest on
many different claims. Ms. Moretz lays out three that are available
to LGB plaintiffs under Title VII. Similarly, equal protection
plaintiffs have available several distinct pathways. As Professor
Conkle urges, they can allege that the alleged discrimination
requires careful scrutiny by a court, given that such discrimination
is rarely justified.9 7 Alternatively, they can allege that the alleged
discrimination is simply irrational-a path whose success and
future potential Professor Eyer lays out.98 The animus cases, in my
93. To be sure, these theories might have some underlying basis in animus, or bad intent
more generally. For example, Ms. Moretz's argument that an LGB plaintiff should be able
to allege discrimination based on her associational choice (e.g., her choice of a spouse or
other intimate partner) implies that such discrimination would in fact be based on an
employer's disapproval of that choice. But because Title VII's text prohibits discrimination
"because of' the employee's protected characteristic (here, her sex), all that is required is
that the employer have discriminated "because of' that characteristic. This language
requires no inquiry into the underlying motive for such discrimination. See, e.g., Charles
Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
911, 916 (2005) ("The Court soon established that certain motivations, such as animus or
disdain, were not essential to a violation: although sufficient, proof of such motives was not
necessary for discrimination under Title VII because an employer discriminates within that
statute's meaning if the employer intends to draw a distinction on prohibited grounds.").
94. Moretz, supra note 4, at 250-54.
95. Id. at 271-72.
96. Id. at 267-71.
97. See supra pt. I (discussing the heightened scrutiny pathway).
98. See supra pt. II (discussing the rational basis pathway).
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view, offer a third alternative, one in which the plaintiff can allege
that the particular discrimination in question is motivated by
something we are willing to call animus.
One could carry this analogy even farther and note that, while
Title VII disparate treatment cases do not require animus, other
theories Ms. Moretz discusses-such as the associational rights
theory-presumably imply a state of affairs in which the employer
disapproves of the employee or her choice-for example, her choice
of intimate partner or family relationship.9 9 One might find a
parallel between Title VII's different answers to the question of
whether animus is required and my own claim, in the
constitutional sphere, that some equal protection claims may
simply require the plaintiff to prove what one might call "innocent
irrationality" while other claims are expressly grounded in
animus. To be sure, this claim is speculative, and vulnerable to the
response that it oversimplifies complex and context-specific species
of discrimination claims, and the distinct structures of Title VII
and the Equal Protection Clause. Still, the broader point remains:
Ms. Moretz's fine analysis of the litigation options LGB Title VII
plaintiffs should enjoy reflects the point that, as I argue in the
conclusion to this response, there are many paths to equality.
IV CONCLUSION: MANY PATHS TO EQUALITY
The three pieces of scholarship to which this response is
directed push in different directions. But they share a common
feature. Each piece reveals the fundamental truth that there are
many doctrinal paths to the same equality goal. Professor Conkle
expresses a preference for suspect class analysis, but nevertheless
acknowledges a role, if limited, for animus doctrine. Professor Eyer
worries that animus doctrine will crowd out non-animus-based
rational basis challenges by causing judges to conjoin irrationality
and animus and insist that any rational basis challenge feature a
plausible animus allegation. She values non-animus-based
rational basis challenges exactly because they provide a path to
success for plaintiffs who cannot (or cannot yet) claim heightened
judicial protection under suspect class analysis, and who cannot
plausibly claim to be the victims of unconstitutional animus. Ms.
99. Moretz, supra note 4, at 257 (discussing a case where an employer fired a worker
once the employer became aware of the employee's interracial child).
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Moretz's piece identifies three distinct legal theories that gay
rights litigators can embrace when arguing that Title VII covers
sexual orientation discrimination.
In my book and in other writings, I have sought to construct a
viable theory of equal protection animus that can provide an
alternative path to success for equal protection plaintiffs beyond
standard rational basis and suspect class/heightened scrutiny
arguments. To be sure, this path presents hazards. Professor
Conkle is correct when he worries about the potential for the
animus concept to further polarize political debate. Professor Eyer
is correct that that concept reflects a splitting of the rational basis
canon she identifies into animus cases and what one might call
"pure irrationality" cases. To the extent that this move reduces the
force of that canon, or, paradoxically, "infects" that canon by
adding a gatekeeping animus requirement, there is reason for
concern.
But these are exactly the reasons work on animus doctrine is
important. In response to Professor Conkle's concern, it is
important for scholars to develop doctrinal structures that allow
courts to uncover and call out animus without necessarily indicting
the subjective motivations of lawmakers or, even worse, their
constituents. In response to Professor Eyer's concern, it is
important for scholars to delineate the proper scope of animus
analysis in order to demarcate its proper domain-and, by
implication, to prevent it from over-spilling its banks into other
doctrines.
The title of my symposium keynote, Call It By Its Name,100
reflects this dual concern. On the one hand, it urges judges and
scholars to, indeed, call animus by its name when it exists. The rise
of xenophobia and cultural conflict in modern American life
requires such judicial candor, if constitutional law is to play any
positive role in American life beyond that of the bloodless
technocrat that measures ends and means as if they were inputs
into a chemical formula. But calling animus by its name also
implies delineating it-identifying it when it exists, but by
extension, declining to use the term when it doesn't. In providing
a path for courts to determine when animus should be found to
exist, this work hopes to identify and explicate an additional, not
a replacement, path to equality-one that responds to the lived
100. Araiza, Call It By Its Name, supra note 3232.
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reality of twenty-first century America, but that also grounds that
response in the aspirations of those who framed the Fourteenth
Amendment during another era of deep cultural conflict.

